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I. Introduction 
The Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence has recognized 
a compelling state interest in preserving the lives of viable 
fetuses.1 When acting to protect a “viable” fetus—one “potentially 
able to live outside the mother’s womb, albeit with artificial 
                                                                                                     
 * Justice Thomas O. Marshall Chair of Constitutional Law, University of 
Georgia School of Law. I would like to thank the other participants in this 
conference and the editors of the Washington and Lee Law Review for their 
helpful comments on my Article. Thank you as well to Raqketa Williams for her 
research assistance. I join the editors in mourning the tragic loss of Lara Gass, a 
gracious and remarkable young woman who played a central role in organizing 
the conference and making the participants feel welcome. 
 1. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (“With respect to the State’s 
important and legitimate interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at 
viability.”). 
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aid”2—the state “may go so far as to proscribe abortion . . . except 
when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.”3 
Allowing relatively unrestricted abortion until fetal viability 
represents an extremely broad recognition of abortion rights by 
international standards.4 Only a handful of countries join the 
United States in permitting abortion for any reason until fetal 
viability or beyond.5 As Justice Blackmun recognized in a 
memorandum to Justice Powell, “[b]y that time [viability], the 
state’s interest [in protecting fetal life] has grown large indeed.”6 
In prior articles, I have critiqued the Court’s failure to offer a 
plausible constitutional or moral justification for treating 
viability as the earliest point at which a state may significantly 
limit abortions.7 Viability varies from one fetus to the next based 
on factors that should be legally and morally irrelevant, including 
the progress and availability of neonatal treatment techniques, 
the race and gender of the fetus, the mother’s altitude during 
gestation, and whether the mother smokes during pregnancy.8 It 
                                                                                                     
 2. Id. at 160.  
 3. Id. at 163–64. 
 4. See Randy Beck, State Interests and the Duration of Abortion Rights, 44 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 31, 40–41 (2013) [hereinafter Beck, State Interests] (showing 
that the viability rule is extreme when compared to abortion laws of other 
countries).  
 5. See id. (noting that most countries require a “legally permissible 
reason” for seeking an abortion or only recognize the right to abort within the 
first twelve weeks of pregnancy (citing Randy Beck, Gonzales, Casey and the 
Viability Rule, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 249, 264 (2009))). 
 6. See Randy Beck, Self-Conscious Dicta: The Origins of Roe v. Wade’s 
Trimester Framework, 51 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 505, 523 (2011) [hereinafter Beck, 
Self-Conscious Dicta] (discussing private correspondence between Justices 
Powell and Blackmun, in which Blackmun indicated his lack of commitment to 
the point marking the end of the first trimester versus another point, such as 
viability).  
 7. See, e.g., Randy Beck, Gonzales, Casey, and the Viability Rule, 103 NW. 
U. L. REV. 249, 271–76 (2009) [hereinafter Beck, Gonzales, Casey and the 
Viability Rule] (noting that the Roe Court failed to provide a constitutional 
principle to support its conclusion that a state may only prohibit abortions of 
viable fetuses and considering whether this omission was rectified in Casey); 
Randy Beck, Transtemporal Separation of Powers in the Law of Precedent, 87 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1405, 1462–63 (2012) (discussing scholars’ analysis of the 
Roe Court’s lack of constitutional justification). 
 8. See Beck, State Interests, supra note 4, at 37–40 (explaining the various 
factors physicians often consider when determining viability of a fetus, but 
noting that viability is arbitrary because many of these factors are “morally and 
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therefore seems difficult to explain why the state’s interest in 
protecting fetal life would become significantly greater after the 
fetus crosses the viability threshold than before.9 Nor does fetal 
viability reduce the burden of pregnancy on the mother.10 
Setting those questions to the side, however, I start this 
Article from the premise that the Court was correct in Roe v. 
Wade11 concerning the significance of fetal viability. I assume for 
the sake of argument that viability is a momentous point in 
pregnancy and that “logical and biological justifications” support 
a compelling state interest in protecting the lives of fetuses that 
have crossed the viability threshold.12 The goal of this Article is to 
highlight factors that individually and in concert significantly 
hinder legislative attempts to preserve the lives of viable fetuses, 
and to identify measures that, if permitted by the courts, could 
facilitate the pursuit of this state interest. 
Part II of the Article argues that Supreme Court case law 
virtually guarantees that some viable fetuses will be aborted even 
though they could in fact survive outside the womb with proper 
care. The Court has required some level of deference to debatable 
viability predictions made by treating physicians, even if those 
predictions may be unduly pessimistic about the prospects for 
fetal survival.13 Part III notes that most abortions take place in 
private facilities operated by abortion providers, making it 
difficult to monitor the provider’s compliance with a state law 
prohibiting postviability abortions.14 By way of illustration, I 
consider the investigation and prosecution of Philadelphia’s Dr. 
Kermit Gosnell, which disclosed a number of techniques Gosnell 
employed to cover up the deaths of hundreds of viable fetuses and 
                                                                                                     
constitutionally irrelevant”). 
 9. See id. at 40 (critiquing the Court’s selection of viability as the 
controlling line because crossing the viability threshold does not increase a 
state’s interest in protecting human life). 
 10. See id. (explaining that viable fetuses impose no less of a burden on the 
mother than pre-viable fetuses). 
 11. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 12. Id. at 163. 
 13. See infra note 46 (explaining Roe v. Wade’s deference to medical 
judgment); infra notes 59–61 and accompanying text (discussing the uncertainty 
of determining fetal viability, which causes disagreement among physicians). 
 14. Infra Part III.  
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newborn infants over an extended period.15 Part IV points out 
that Dr. Gosnell’s violations of Pennsylvania law were facilitated 
by the unwillingness of public officials to provide oversight and 
ensure regulatory compliance, notwithstanding numerous reports 
of serious problems at Gosnell’s clinic.16 Part V suggests that the 
Supreme Court could facilitate state protection of viable fetuses 
by allowing prohibition of elective abortions at a time shortly 
before viability, such as twenty weeks gestation, a line that would 
be easier to enforce than viability itself.17 Additional protection 
could be afforded to viable fetuses by allowing states to require 
hospitalization at some point in the second trimester, so that 
abortions near the viability threshold would take place in an 
environment that was both safer and less isolated from the 
broader medical community. 
II. The Requirement of Deference to Abortion Providers Virtually 
Ensures the Abortion of Some Viable Fetuses 
The Supreme Court has attributed considerable significance 
to the point in pregnancy described as “viability,” treating the 
fetus potentially able to live outside the womb as categorically 
distinct from the same fetus a few weeks or a few days before 
viability.18 At the same time, the importance of viability in the 
Supreme Court’s case law has diminished over the years.19 Dicta 
in Roe—part of the opinion’s “trimester framework”—identified 
viability as the earliest point at which a state’s interest in fetal 
life becomes “compelling,” justifying a prohibition on abortion.20 
                                                                                                     
 15. See infra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing the prosecution of 
Dr. Kermit Gosnell). 
 16. Infra Part IV.  
 17. Infra Part V.  
 18. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (concluding that the 
“compelling point” for a state’s interest in protecting potential life is at 
viability). 
 19. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878–79 
(1992) (rejecting Roe’s “trimester framework” and stressing the state’s “profound 
interest in protecting potential life”). 
 20. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–64 (“With respect to the State’s important and 
legitimate interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at viability . . . . 
[The State] may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except 
when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.”); Beck, Self-
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In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,21 
the controlling plurality opinion rejected Roe’s trimester 
framework and concluded that states could legislate to protect 
fetal life from the outset of pregnancy, so long as the regulation 
did not place an “undue burden” on abortion rights.22 However, 
the Casey plurality, again in dicta, deferred to Roe’s conclusion 
that abortion may only be proscribed after fetal viability.23 More 
recently, in Gonzales v. Carhart,24 the Court upheld a ban on the 
intact dilation and evacuation abortion technique, even prior to 
viability,25 notwithstanding the dissent’s claim that the majority 
had “blur[red] the line, firmly drawn in Casey, between 
previability and postviability abortions.”26 
Forty years after Roe, the Court’s rationale for selecting 
viability as a controlling line in pregnancy remains obscure.27 In 
neither Roe nor Casey did the Court offer a plausible moral or 
constitutional reason for concluding that the state interest in 
fetal life justifies substantial limits on abortion only after the 
fetus might be able to survive outside the womb.28 But 
notwithstanding the absence of legal or philosophical 
justification, one might think that the viability rule at least has 
the virtue of clarity.29 The Casey plurality highlighted this 
                                                                                                     
Conscious Dicta, supra note 6, at 516 (noting that evidence from case files shows 
Justices in the Roe majority knew they were creating dicta in drawing a line at 
viability). 
 21. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 22. See id. at 878–79 (recognizing the central right of Roe but rejecting its 
“trimester framework,” thereby allowing states to impose regulations on 
abortion services that satisfy an “undue burden” analysis). 
 23. See id. at 879 (reaffirming the conclusion of Roe that states may 
regulate and prohibit abortion after viability). 
 24. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 25. See id. at 147 (concluding that the Act prohibiting the dilation and 
evacuation abortion techniques is not void for vagueness, does not impose an 
undue burden, and is not invalid on its face). 
 26. Id. at 171 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 27. See Beck, Gonzales, Casey, and the Viability Rule, supra note 7, at 279 
(“In the post-Gonzales world, the task of establishing the legitimacy of the 
viability rule has become significantly more demanding.”). 
 28. See id. at 267–76 (discussing the Supreme Court’s failure to justify the 
viability rule). 
 29. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869–70 
(1992) (arguing right to abortion should be governed by “a line that is clear” and 
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rationale in explaining its decision to adhere to viability as a 
controlling line in pregnancy: “Liberty must not be extinguished 
for want of a line that is clear.”30 
In the abstract arena of legal discourse, viability seems to 
offer a clear conceptual line that distinguishes two classes of 
fetuses: those that can survive outside the womb and are subject 
to legal protection, and those that cannot survive outside the 
womb and may not be effectively protected by the state.31 
Regrettably, though, the seeming clarity of the viability rule 
evaporates when one understands how viability determinations 
are made in medical practice. The viability of a fetus is not an 
objective description of a readily observable set of 
characteristics.32 It is instead a medical prognosis, a prediction 
about what would happen if you removed the fetus from the 
nurturing environment of the womb and instead employed 
whatever neonatal treatment techniques were at hand.33 In 
Colautti v. Franklin,34 the Supreme Court emphasized “the 
uncertainty of the viability determination”35: 
As the record in this case indicates, a physician determines 
whether or not a fetus is viable after considering a number of 
variables: the gestational age of the fetus, derived from the 
reported menstrual history of the woman; fetal weight, based 
on an inexact estimate of the size and condition of the uterus; 
the woman’s general health and nutrition; the quality of the 
available medical facilities; and other factors. Because of the 
number and the imprecision of these variables, the probability 
of any particular fetus’ obtaining meaningful life outside the 
womb can be determined only with difficulty. Moreover, the 
record indicates that even if agreement may be reached on the 
                                                                                                     
then drawing the line at viability). 
 30. Id. at 869. 
 31. See id. (explaining the Court’s insistence on “drawing the line” at 
viability).   
 32. See Beck, Gonzales, Casey, and the Viability Rule, supra note 7, at 257 
(explaining that doctors determining viability must predict the likely 
consequences of premature delivery, often with the assistance of medical 
research on the survival rates of premature infants). 
 33. Id.  
 34. 439 U.S. 379 (1979). 
 35. See id. at 395–96 (concluding that the “uncertainty of the viability 
determination” makes it problematic to impose strict civil or criminal liability 
against physicians performing abortions near the viability threshold).  
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probability of survival, different physicians equate viability 
with different probabilities of survival, and some physicians 
refuse to equate viability with any numerical probability at all. 
In the face of these uncertainties, it is not unlikely that 
experts will disagree over whether a particular fetus in the 
second trimester has advanced to the stage of viability.36 
Once it is recognized that viability represents an uncertain 
medical prediction, it is understandable that doctors might 
disagree about which fetuses have arrived at that stage of 
development.37 In some circumstances, all competent doctors 
should reach the same conclusion about the viability or 
nonviability of a particular fetus.38 In cases nearer to the margin, 
however, two doctors might reasonably disagree about viability, 
just as they might disagree about the likely consequences of a 
particular medical treatment or the length of time a particular 
patient has to live.39 
Given that viability determinations are uncertain and 
debatable, it follows that some of them will almost certainly be 
wrong.40 On the one hand, a physician might reach a mistaken 
conclusion that a fetus can survive outside the womb. If a doctor 
performs a Caesarian section to deliver what he believes to be a 
viable fetus, the infant might nevertheless fail to survive, 
notwithstanding the best efforts of a neonatal intensive care unit. 
Conversely, a doctor might mistakenly declare nonviable a fetus 
that could, in reality, survive with proper care. Errors in this 
direction are less likely to be detected if the viable fetus perishes 
in the course of an abortion. 
                                                                                                     
 36. Id.  
 37. See id. at 396 (“[D]ifferent physicians equate viability with different 
probabilities of survival . . . .”); Beck, Gonzales, Casey, and the Viability Rule, 
supra note 7, at 271 (noting that viability causes disagreement among medical 
professionals because it involves predictions made on a case-by-case basis using 
various factors that change over time (citations omitted)).   
 38. But see Colautti, 439 U.S. at 395–96 (explaining the uncertainty of 
determining viability, which may lead experts to disagree over whether a 
particular fetus is viable). 
 39. See id. (“[I]t is not unlikely that experts will disagree over whether a 
particular fetus in the second trimester has advanced to the stage of viability.”). 
 40. See Beck, State Interests, supra note 4, at 37 (noting that different 
doctors might classify the same fetus as viable or nonviable, due to differences 
in skill and treatment philosophy) (citing Beck, Gonzales, Casey, and the 
Viability Rule, supra note 7, at 260). 
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The Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence seems to clearly 
support two propositions: (1) by the time a fetus can potentially 
survive outside the womb, the state has a compelling interest in 
protecting the life of that fetus;41 and (2) a doctor may mistakenly 
classify a viable fetus as nonviable.42 From those two 
propositions, it would seem to follow that the state needs a 
regulatory means to protect viable fetuses against the effects of 
such medical errors.43 After all, compelling state interests are 
interests of the highest magnitude.44 They are so important that 
they justify qualification of constitutional rights.45 If the Roe 
Court was correct about the significance of fetal viability, the 
state should seemingly have some means by which it can 
vindicate its compelling interest in protecting a viable fetus at 
risk of death due to a mistaken medical conclusion that it is not 
viable. 
Contrary to these expectations, the Supreme Court’s case law 
has instead stressed deference to a doctor’s potentially mistaken 
viability determinations, making it difficult for states to protect 
viable fetuses in cases near the margin. As commentators have 
noted, Roe and its early progeny seem to focus on the interests of 
doctors as much as their patients,46 perhaps a result of Justice 
                                                                                                     
 41. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837 
(1992) (reaffirming Roe’s conclusion that after viability, a state’s interest in 
protecting potential human life allows it to regulate and proscribe abortion, 
except where it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother (citing 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973))); Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–64 (concluding 
that the state’s interest in protecting potential life becomes “compelling” at 
viability). 
 42. See, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395–96 (1979) (explaining 
the various and uncertain factors used to predict viability, which may lead to 
disagreement among professionals).  
 43. See infra Part V (discussing the author’s proposed regulations). 
 44. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (noting that “only 
those interests of the highest order” could justify restrictions on free exercise of 
religion). 
 45. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Rts., 462 U.S. 416, 428 
(1983) (“At viability this interest in protecting the potential life of the unborn 
child is so important that the State may proscribe abortions altogether, ‘except 
when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.’” (quoting Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973)), overruled on other grounds by Casey, 505 
U.S. 833).  
 46. See, e.g., Yvonne Lindgren, The Rhetoric of Choice: Restoring 
Healthcare to the Abortion Right, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 385, 393 (2013) (“In Roe v. 
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Blackmun’s years representing the Mayo Clinic before he became 
a judge.47 The Roe opinion sometimes framed its discussion in 
terms of doctors’ rights: in the first trimester, for instance, the 
Court said “the attending physician, in consultation with his 
patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, 
that, in his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be 
terminated.”48 This physician-centered view of abortion remains 
apparent in later opinions dealing with state regulations relating 
to fetal viability.49 In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. 
Danforth,50 for instance, the Court noted that in Roe, “[t]he 
participation by the attending physician in the abortion decision, 
and his responsibility in that decision . . . were emphasized.”51 In 
keeping with this emphasis on empowering medical practitioners, 
Danforth described viability as “a point purposefully left flexible 
for professional determination, and dependent upon developing 
                                                                                                     
Wade the Court framed the right of abortion as the right of doctors to practice 
medicine according to their professional judgment rather than recognizing 
abortion as a right of women’s health that necessarily included access to 
abortion services.” (citations omitted)). The Court’s insistence on deference to 
the judgments of the treating physician traces back to Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 
179 (1973), the companion case to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). In Doe, the 
Court struck down a Georgia provision for review by a hospital review 
committee of the treating physician’s abortion recommendation, which it viewed 
as “basically redundant.” Id. at 195–98. It also rejected a separate requirement 
that two physicians examine the woman and concur in the treating physician’s 
recommendation of an abortion: “Required acquiescence by co-practitioners has 
no rational connection with a patient’s needs and unduly infringes on the 
physician’s right to practice.” Id. at 198–99. 
 47. See Nan D. Hunter, Justice Blackmun, Abortion, and the Myth of 
Medical Independence, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 147, 147 (2006)  
The most common explanation of how this modest man came to 
produce such an immodest decision [Roe] draws on Blackmun’s 
background as resident counsel for the Mayo Clinic and his 
admiration of the medical profession. Justice Blackmun had wanted 
to become a doctor; later in life he became a lawyer for doctors, and 
he brought to the Court a deep attitude of protectiveness toward 
physicians.  
 48. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). 
 49. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 61 
(1976) (relying on Roe to explain the role of the medical professional in 
determining viability).   
 50. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
 51. Id. at 61. 
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medical skill and technical ability.”52 The Court upheld the 
definition of “viability” in a Missouri statute only because it left 
determination of viability to the judgment of the treating 
physician: 
[W]e agree with the District Court that it is not the proper 
function of the legislature or the courts to place viability, 
which essentially is a medical concept, at a specific point in the 
gestation period. The time when viability is achieved may vary 
with each pregnancy, and the determination of whether a 
particular fetus is viable is, and must be, a matter for the 
judgment of the responsible attending physician. The 
[Missouri] definition of viability . . . merely reflects this fact.53 
Danforth therefore rejected the contention that “a specified 
number of weeks in pregnancy must be fixed by statute as the 
point of viability.”54 
The Court revisited viability determinations a few terms 
later in Colautti, again emphasizing the primacy of the judgment 
of the doctor performing the abortion: 
Viability is reached when, in the judgment of the attending 
physician on the particular facts of the case before him, there 
is a reasonable likelihood of the fetus’ sustained survival 
outside the womb, with or without artificial support. Because 
this point may differ with each pregnancy, neither the 
legislature nor the courts may proclaim one of the elements 
entering into the ascertainment of viability—be it weeks of 
gestation or fetal weight or any other single factor—as the 
determinant of when the State has a compelling interest in the 
life or health of the fetus. Viability is the critical point. And we 
have recognized no attempt to stretch the point of viability one 
way or the other.55 
                                                                                                     
 52. See id. (“Finally, for the stage subsequent to viability, a point 
purposefully left flexible for professional determination, and dependent upon 
developing medical skill and technical ability, the State may regulate an 
abortion to protect the life of the fetus and even may proscribe abortion except 
where it is necessary . . . .”). 
 53. Id. at 64. The Missouri statute defined “viability” as “that stage of fetal 
development when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely 
outside the womb by natural or artificial life-supportive systems.” Id. at 63. 
 54. See id. at 65 (“We thus do not accept appellants' contention that a 
specified number of weeks in pregnancy must be fixed by statute as the point of 
viability.”). 
 55. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 388–89 (1979).  
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The Colautti Court deemed a Pennsylvania statute 
unconstitutionally vague where it imposed duties on a doctor who 
determined that a fetus “is viable or if there is sufficient reason to 
believe that the fetus may be viable.”56 One concern was whether 
the “sufficient reason” language referred to a purely subjective 
evaluation by the attending physician, or whether it 
contemplated an objective second-guessing of the physician’s 
determination: 
[I]t is ambiguous whether there must be “sufficient reason” 
from the perspective of the judgment, skill, and training of the 
attending physician, or “sufficient reason” from the perspective 
of a cross section of the medical community or a panel of 
experts. The latter, obviously, portends not an inconsequential 
hazard for the typical private practitioner who may not have 
the skills and technology that are readily available at a 
teaching hospital or large medical center.57 
A second ambiguity flowed from the statutory identification of 
two separate points in gestation—when the fetus “is viable” and 
when it “may be viable”—either of which would impose 
heightened duties on the doctor.58 The Court reinforced its 
vagueness analysis by pointing to the absence of a scienter 
requirement with respect to the treating physician’s 
determination of fetal viability:  
The prospect of . . . disagreement [among doctors about 
viability], in conjunction with a statute imposing strict civil 
and criminal liability for an erroneous determination of 
viability, could have a profound chilling effect on the 
willingness of physicians to perform abortions near the point 
of viability in the manner indicated by their best medical 
judgment.59 
The precise implications of Danforth and Colautti are open to 
debate. The Court did not accord complete deference to the doctor 
                                                                                                     
 56. See id. at 380 n.1. (reciting relevant portions of the Pennsylvania 
statute). 
 57. Id. at 391–92. 
 58. See id. at 393 (explaining that “may be viable” could mean there is a 
remote possibility that the fetus can survive outside the womb, yet it has not 
attained the reasonable likelihood of survival usually associated with viability, 
or it could refer to viability “as physicians understand it”). 
 59. Id. at 396. 
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performing the abortion in either case.60 Roe itself indicated that, 
as in other medical contexts, the doctor’s medical judgments with 
respect to abortion are subject to oversight by the state: 
The decision vindicates the right of the physician to 
administer medical treatment according to his professional 
judgment up to the points where important state interests 
provide compelling justifications for intervention. Up to those 
points, the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, 
and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for 
it must rest with the physician. If an individual practitioner 
abuses the privilege of exercising proper medical judgment, 
the usual remedies, judicial and intra-professional, are 
available.61 
Colautti referred to this portion of Roe, suggesting that an abuse 
of proper medical judgment in the context of a viability 
determination would be subject to “judicial and intra-
professional” remedies.62 
At the same time, Danforth and Colautti do seem to give 
primacy to physicians’ viability determinations when they cannot 
be viewed as abuses of medical judgment, even if other doctors 
would reach contrary conclusions.63 It is ironic that Colautti 
accepts as a given that abortion practitioners “may not have the 
skills and technology” of a teaching hospital or large medical 
center, and then makes the medical judgments of such 
practitioners the standard for determining the legal rights of 
potentially viable fetuses.64 The irony grows more troubling when 
                                                                                                     
 60. See id. at 387 (noting the availability of judicial and professional 
remedies if the doctor abused the privilege of making medical judgments); 
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 64–65 (1976) (noting 
that the determination of fetal viability is to be made using the exercise of  
“professional judgment”). 
 61. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165–66 (1973).  
 62. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 (1979) (explaining the 
Court’s past emphasis on affording the physician the discretion to determine 
viability (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 166)). 
 63. See id. at 387–88 (explaining the Court’s deference to medical judgment 
in Roe, Doe, and Danforth and reaffirming the principle (citations omitted)); 
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 64 (recognizing that “viability was a matter of medical 
judgment, skill, and technical ability”). 
 64. Compare Colautti, 439 U.S. at 391–92 (explaining that the statute at 
issue is unclear as to whether there must be sufficient reason to believe a fetus 
is viable from the perspective of the medical community or the attending  
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one recognizes that the doctors making these decisions about the 
legal status of another human being may operate under a conflict 
of interest.65 Doctors willing to perform late-term abortions can 
earn significant fees.66 Most abortion providers will not perform 
abortions after twenty weeks because of the increased risk of 
complications.67 Consequently, providers willing to perform 
abortions near the margin of viability, or after viability, may be 
able to charge higher rates.68 The potential revenue from near-
                                                                                                     
physician, who may be a private practitioner without the skills and technology 
of larger facilities), with id. at 396 (“We reaffirm, however, that ‘the 
determination of whether a particular fetus is viable is, and must be, a matter 
for the judgment of the responsible attending physician.’” (quoting Danforth, 
428 U.S. at 64)).  
 65. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (“No man ought 
certainly to be a judge in his own cause, or in any cause in respect to which he 
has the least interest or bias.”). 
 66. See ABORTION AFTER THE FIRST TRIMESTER IN THE UNITED STATES 2 
(2013), http://www.plannedparenthood.org/files/PPFA/Abortion_After_First_Tri 
mester.pdf [hereinafter ABORTION AFTER THE FIRST TRIMESTER] (“[I]n 2009, non-
hospital facilities charged an average of $1500 for abortion at 20 weeks.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 67. REPORT OF THE GRAND JURY at 3, In re County Investigating Grand Jury 
XXIII (2011) (Misc. No. 0009901-2008) [hereinafter GRAND JURY REPORT] (“Most 
doctors won’t perform late second-trimester abortions, from approximately the 
20th week of pregnancy, because of the risks involved.”); id. at 27 (reporting 
that Dr. Gosnell “had many late-term Philadelphia patients because most other 
local clinics would not perform procedures past 20 weeks”);  Rachel K. Jones, 
Mia R. S. Zolna, Stanley K. Henshaw & Lawrence B. Finer, Abortion in the 
United States: Incidence and Access to Services, 2005, 40 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & 
REPROD. HEALTH 6, 14 (2008) (noting that only 20% of abortion providers offered 
services at twenty weeks and only eight percent offered services at twenty-four 
weeks); Abortion Care, UNM CTR. FOR REPROD. HEALTH, 
http://www.unmcrh.org/abortion-care/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2013) (“We offer 
abortion care up to 22 weeks gestational age (time since last menstrual 
period).”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). One study of 
abortion mortality found 3.4 deaths per 100,000 abortions performed between 
sixteen and twenty weeks, compared to 8.9 deaths per 100,000 for abortions 
performed at twenty-one weeks or above. Linda A. Bartlett et al., Risk Factors 
for Legal Induced Abortion-Related Mortality in the United States, 103 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 729, 733 (2004). 
 68. See GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 67, at app. C (2005 price list 
showing price of $1625 for abortion performed at or between twenty-three and 
twenty-four weeks). For some particularly late abortions, Dr. Kermit Gosnell of 
Philadelphia reportedly charged $2500–$3000. See id. at 81 (noting a sliding 
scale of charges “with late-term abortions sometimes costing $2,500 or more”); 
id. at 88 (noting testimony from employees and patients who said Gosnell 
charged anywhere from $2,500–$3,000 for late-term abortions). 
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viability abortions may provide a powerful incentive for finding a 
marginal fetus nonviable so the abortion may be performed.69 
Other nonmedical factors, such as a strong commitment to 
women’s reproductive autonomy, might also incline a doctor to 
declare a fetus nonviable in situations open to debate.70 
Colautti seemed to accept as normal the idea that different 
physicians might agree on the probability of fetal survival and yet 
reach different conclusions as to fetal viability.71 This goes a long 
way toward putting doctors’ viability determinations on the honor 
system, rather than treating viability as a serious regulatory line 
with weighty state interests at stake. The Court’s requirement of 
deference to the treating physician would seem to shield a doctor 
who performs an abortion on a fetus declared “nonviable” even if 
other doctors with different financial and professional incentives 
would reach the opposite conclusion.72 This requirement of 
deference to the attending physician’s viability determinations 
virtually guarantees that some fetuses will be aborted in cases 
near the margin even though they could in fact survive outside 
the womb with proper care.73 In such situations, the Court’s case 
law requiring deference to a doctor desiring to perform an 
abortion undermines the state’s acknowledged and compelling 
interest in protecting viable unborn human life.74 
                                                                                                     
 69. See Jones, supra note 67, at 14 (noting that the average cost of an 
abortion at ten weeks is $523 but the average cost at twenty weeks is three 
times this amount). 
 70. Cf. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 485 (Cal. 1990) 
(recognizing that a doctor’s medical judgment may be influenced by personal 
interests). 
 71. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 396 (1979) (explaining that 
physicians may agree on a fetus’ probability of survival, but their opinions may 
differ on whether to associate viability with that level of survival). 
 72. See Beck, Gonzales, Casey, and the Viability Rule, supra note 7, at 260 
(explaining that deference to medical judgments may prove problematic where 
the doctor has financial, legal, or ideological interests at stake (citing Moore, 793 
P.2d at 485)). 
 73. See Beck, State’s Interest, supra note 4, at 57 (“The imprecision of the 
viability line will make it very difficult in some cases to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a particular doctor knew he or she was aborting a viable 
fetus.”). 
 74. See id. (noting that the viability rule defers to the judgment of the 
physician to such a degree that it “undermines the goal of regulating the 
physician’s conduct”). 
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III. Providers Sometimes Conceal Performance of Postviability 
Abortions 
A second barrier to state protection of viable fetuses results 
from the fact that abortions typically take place in private clinics 
and doctors’ offices operated by a small number of personnel.75 In 
Doe v. Bolton,76 the Supreme Court struck down a requirement 
that all abortions be performed in an accredited hospital.77 In 
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,78 the 
Court invalidated an ordinance requiring hospitalization for any 
abortion in the second trimester.79 These decisions have fostered 
the proliferation of medical facilities dedicated to performance of 
abortions as their primary activity.80 The Guttmacher Institute 
reports that “[n]early all U.S. abortions take place in nonhospital 
settings.”81 
According to Guttmacher Institute researchers, as of 2005, 
only twenty percent of abortion clinics performed abortions at 
twenty weeks gestation, and only eight percent reported that they 
did so at twenty-four weeks.82 If these figures remain accurate, 
many abortion clinics would not seem to present a high risk of 
                                                                                                     
 75. Cf. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 435 
(1983) (noting that second-trimester abortions rarely took place in hospitals), 
overruled on other grounds by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833 (1992); see also Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, TRAP Laws Gain 
Political Traction While Abortion Clinics—And the Women They Serve—Pay the 
Price, 16 GUTTMACHER POLICY REV. 7, 7 (2013) (noting that nearly all abortions 
in the United States take place in non-hospital settings) (citation omitted). 
 76. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
 77. See id. at 194–95 (concluding that the provision in question requiring 
hospitalization for second trimester abortions was invalid because the state 
failed to prove that only hospitals could satisfy the state’s health interest). 
 78. 462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Planned Parenthood 
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 79. See id. at 434–39 (arguing an Akron ordinance imposed a burden on 
access to abortion procedures because requiring hospitalization may result in 
additional and unnecessary expenses). 
 80. David M. Smolin, Cultural and Technological Obstacles to the 
Mainstreaming of Abortion, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 261, 261 (1993) (“Most 
abortions are performed in specialized abortion clinics, rather than in hospitals 
or physicians’ offices.”). 
 81. Gold & Nash, supra note 75, at 7. 
 82. Jones et al., supra note 67, at 14. 
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performing postviability abortions.83 Because most abortions do 
not occur in hospital settings, however, when a clinic does 
perform abortions near the viability threshold, much of the 
information relevant to the viability determination—fetal weight, 
mother’s health, race and gender of the fetus, ultrasound images, 
last reported menstrual period and the like—will be in the 
possession of the doctor and his staff.84 A doctor willing to violate 
a state law prohibiting abortion after viability would presumably 
screen employees to ensure loyalty.85 While most states ask 
doctors to submit information about each abortion, including the 
gestational age of the fetus (California being a notable 
exception),86 one would not expect a doctor desiring to perform 
postviability abortions to accurately comply with such reporting 
rules.87 
The prosecution of Philadelphia’s Dr. Kermit Gosnell 
highlights steps taken by one profit-motivated abortion provider 
to conceal the performance of postviability abortions.88 Gosnell 
was convicted in 2013 on hundreds of charges, including three 
counts of first-degree murder for killing infants born alive at his 
                                                                                                     
 83. But see infra notes 165–66 and accompanying text (noting that Gosnell 
falsified records and failed to report numerous late-term abortions).  
 84. See, e.g., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 67, at 247 (noting the 
difficulty in obtaining evidence for criminal prosecution because the illegal 
activity took place inside Gosnell’s clinic). 
 85. But see Wendy Saltzman, Delaware Abortion Clinic Facing Charges of 
Unsafe and Unsanitary Conditions, ABC ACTION NEWS, WPVI-TV (July 24, 
2013), http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?id=9059172 (last visited Jan. 10, 2014) 
(reporting recent cases of abortion clinic staff disclosing violations of the law by 
their employers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).   
 86. See STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: ABORTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
(2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_ARR.pdf (charting the 
forty-seven states requiring reporting). 
 87. See GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 67, at 156 (detailing inaccuracies 
in reports filed by Gosnell). 
 88. Joseph A. Slobodzian, Gosnell Guilty of Three Murder Counts, PHILA. 
INQUIRER (May 15, 2013), http://articles.philly.com/2013-05-15/news/ 39258185_  
1_verdict-jury-gosnell-case (last visited Jan. 10, 2014) (reporting the outcome of 
Dr. Kermit Gosnell’s murder trial) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Sarah Hoye & Sunny Hostin, Doctor Found Guilty of First-Degree 
Murder in Philadelphia Abortion Case, CNN (May 14, 2013) http://www.cnn. 
com/2013/05/13/justice/pennsylvania-abortion-doctor-trial/ (last visited Jan. 10, 
2014) (reporting Dr. Kermit Gosnell’s murder convictions) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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clinic, involuntary manslaughter in the death of an adult patient, 
and twenty-one counts of performing abortions on women more 
than twenty-four weeks pregnant.89 The grand jury that 
investigated Gosnell’s clinic produced a lengthy report, 
suggesting that the counts recommended for prosecution 
represented just the tip of the iceberg.90 According to the grand 
jury, Gosnell attracted business from surrounding states because 
he “was known as a doctor who would perform abortions at any 
stage, without regard for legal limits.”91 The grand jury estimated 
that Gosnell performed at least four or five illegal abortions a 
week.92 In addition to performing abortions on viable fetuses in 
utero,93 Gosnell’s clinic often induced delivery of live babies at the 
clinic, at which point Gosnell or another staff member would 
“[e]nsur[e] fetal demise” by “sticking scissors into the back of the 
baby’s neck and cutting the spinal cord. He called that 
‘snipping.’”94 The grand jury reported that “[o]ver the years, there 
were hundreds of ‘snippings,’” but “[m]ost of these acts cannot be 
                                                                                                     
 89. Slobodzian, supra note 88; Hoye & Hostin, supra note 88. 
 90. See GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 67, at 219–47 (suggesting various 
criminal charges against Dr. Kermit Gosnell). 
 91. Id. at 27. 
 92. Id. at 79. 
 93. See id. (“Steven Massof estimated that in 40 percent of the second-
trimester abortions performed by Gosnell, the fetuses were beyond 24 weeks 
gestational age. Latosha Lewis testified that Gosnell performed procedures over 
24 weeks ‘too much to count,’ and ones up to 26 weeks ‘very often.’”); id. at 78  
Several of the clinic’s former staff told the Grand Jury that Gosnell 
performed many, many abortions beyond the legal limit in 
Pennsylvania—a gestational age of 24 weeks. Their testimony is 
confirmed by clinic files, by fetal remains found at the facility, by 
photographs of babies that Gosnell delivered and then killed, and by 
a 30-plus-weeks baby girl born dead at a hospital after Gosnell had 
inserted laminaria to begin a third trimester abortion. 
 94. Id. at 4; see also id. at 99–100 (“Gosnell’s staff testified about scores of 
gruesome killings of such born-alive infants carried out mainly by Gosnell, but 
also by employees Steve Massof, Lynda Williams, and Adrienne Moton. These 
killings became so routine that no one could put an exact number on them. They 
were considered ‘standard procedure.’”). One of Gosnell’s employees indicated 
that the doctor preferred it when the baby was delivered because it involved less 
work for him and reduced the risk that he would perforate the uterus, 
something that had resulted in a number of malpractice suits. Id. at 31. 
Therefore, he would sometimes have his staff press on patients’ abdomens to 
bring about delivery. Id. 
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prosecuted, because Gosnell destroyed the files.”95 “It was 
Gosnell’s standard business practice,” they concluded, “to slay 
viable babies.”96 
The grand jury’s report noted a variety of steps Dr. Gosnell 
took that helped hide his performance of illegal postviability 
abortions: 
• Gosnell regularly falsified reports submitted to the state 
Department of Health to vastly underreport the number of 
second- and third-trimester abortions he performed.97 His 
final quarterly report indicated that he had performed 118 
first-trimester abortions and two second-trimester 
abortions. However, in reviewing just a few files, state 
officials found evidence of at least six second-trimester 
abortions performed in the last two months of the 
quarter.98 
• The reports Gosnell filed between 2000 and 2010 
apparently indicated that there were no complications 
from abortions performed at his clinic,99 even though two 
                                                                                                     
 95. Id. at 5; see also id. at 114 (noting that an unlicensed doctor at the 
clinic, Steven Massof, “admitted that there were about 100 instances in which 
he severed the spinal cord after seeing a breath or some sign of life”). 
 96. See id. at 25 (“It was Gosnell’s standard business practice, to slay viable 
babies. The women who died, or whose health he recklessly endangered or 
irreparably harmed, were simply collateral damage for the doctor’s corrupt and 
criminal enterprise.”). 
 97. See id. at 156 (detailing failure by Dr. Gosnell to file accurate reports 
required by the Department of Health). 
 98. Id. Testimony heard by the grand jury indicated that as of 2000, 
Gosnell was performing between five and six second-trimester abortions each 
week, but that as referrals of first-trimester abortions diminished, Gosnell came 
to rely more on referrals for late-term abortions. See id. at 26–28 (relating 
testimony about how Dr. Gosnell ran his clinic and how it changed over time to 
allow for more late-term abortions).  
 99. See id. at 171 (noting that the forms the Department of Health relied 
on to compile data for its reports were falsified by Gosnell and therefore 
“worthless”). It is not clear how to reconcile the grand jury’s statement on page 
171 that the forms filed by Gosnell between 2000 and 2010 recorded only one 
second-trimester abortion with the statement on page 156 that the report for the 
last quarter of 2009 recorded two second-trimester abortions; however, both 
references are consistent in that they show Gosnell vastly underreporting the 
number of second-trimester abortions he performed. Compare id. at 156 (“The 
most recent report filed by Gosnell’s clinic stated that it had performed 118 first-
trimester and 2 second-trimester abortions in the fourth quarter of 2009.”), with 
id. at 171 (“The forms that Gosnell filed between 2000 and 2010—the ones DOH 
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patients died from abortion complications during that time 
period and several others sued Gosnell for malpractice.100 
• When an ultrasound showed that a fetus was beyond 
twenty-four weeks gestation, Dr. Gosnell trained his staff 
to “fudge the measurement process” by “aim[ing] the 
ultrasound probe at an angle to make the fetus look 
smaller.”101 
• When a fetus was beyond twenty-four weeks gestation, 
Gosnell would record in the file that the gestational age 
was 24.5 weeks, regardless of the actual gestational age.102 
• Much of the time Gosnell performed illegal abortions in 
front of his staff.103 But there were some, abortions of “the 
really big ones,” that even he was afraid to perform in 
front of others. These abortions were scheduled for 
Sundays, a day when the clinic was closed and none of the 
regular employees were present. Only one person was 
allowed to assist with these special cases—Gosnell’s 
wife.104  
• According to clinic staff, Gosnell took patient files home 
and did not keep files for most of his late-term abortions at 
the clinic.105 Only some of these files were recovered and 
one was found in his car, partially shredded.106 
                                                                                                     
then relied on to compile its reports to the Legislature—recorded only one 
second-trimester abortion and no complications.”).  
 100. See infra notes 131 and 140 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the two women who died from complications after receiving abortions at 
Gosnell’s clinic. 
 101. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 67, at 75; see also id. at 79–81 
(including testimony from former employees of Dr. Gosnell who were trained to 
manipulate ultrasound images so that fetuses appeared smaller). 
 102. See id. at 4 (explaining that for almost every second ultrasound 
performed, a gestational age of 24.5 weeks was recorded even though “most of 
these pregnancies were considerably more advanced”). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 5–6; see also id. at 81 (“Lewis and Massof both testified that they 
believed Gosnell dealt with some of the patients with the longest-term 
pregnancies on Sundays, when his staff was not at the clinic.”). 
 105. See id. at 83 (recounting testimony of two clinic employees who stated 
that Dr. Gosnell destroyed patient files or took them home if he did not believe 
the files should be in the clinic due to the advanced stage of the pregnancy).  
 106. See id. (noting that some patient files were found in a search of Dr. 
Gosnell’s home and car, and of these files, one was partially shredded). The 
grand jury believed that falsification, removal and destruction of files prevented 
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• Doctors in Pennsylvania are supposed to send tissue from 
late term abortions to a pathologist to examine for 
evidence that the fetus was viable or born alive.107 Gosnell 
did not comply with this requirement.108 
While the grand jury had voluminous evidence of the general 
course of practice at Gosnell’s clinic, they found it difficult to 
pursue charges in many of the particular cases because it was 
difficult to secure evidence clear enough for criminal prosecution: 
“Gosnell, we are convinced, committed hundreds of acts of 
infanticide. He got away with them for decades because they all 
took place inside his clinic.”109 
IV. Regulators in Some States Are Unwilling to Closely Supervise 
Abortion Providers 
The Gosnell case shows how one abortion provider, over the 
course of many years, avoided detection as he and his employees 
ended the lives of hundreds of viable fetuses and newly delivered 
infants. One possible solution to such problems would be close 
oversight by state officials responsible for regulating abortion 
clinics. The Gosnell case, however, highlights a third barrier to 
state protection of viable fetuses. As documented by the Gosnell 
grand jury, officials responsible for protecting public health in 
Pennsylvania proved unwilling to enforce applicable laws 
regulating abortion, in part for political or ideological reasons.110 
                                                                                                     
prosecution in a large number of cases where charges would have been 
appropriate. See id. at 115   
We believe, given the manner in which Gosnell operated, that he 
killed the vast majority of babies that he aborted after 24 weeks . . . . 
Because files were falsified or removed from the facility and possibly 
destroyed, we cannot substantiate all of the individual cases in which 
charges might otherwise have resulted. 
 107. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3214(c) (West 2103) (“When there is an 
abortion performed after the first trimester of pregnancy where the physician 
has certified the unborn child is not viable, the dead unborn child and all tissue 
removed at the time of the abortion shall be submitted for tissue analysis to 
a . . . pathologist.”).   
 108. See GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 67, at 75 (noting Gosnell’s various 
violations of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act). 
 109. Id. at 247. 
 110. See id. at 137–215 (detailing lack of investigation of Gosnell’s practices 
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As a consequence, abortion providers in Pennsylvania operated 
without significant oversight.111 
The agency with the principal statutory authority to regulate 
abortion clinics in Pennsylvania is the state Department of 
Health.112 The grand jury concluded that “[t]he Department of 
Health conducted sporadic, inadequate inspections [of Gosnell’s 
clinic] for 13 years, and then none at all between 1993 and 
2010.”113 The clinic was inspected when it opened in 1979, with 
later reviews in 1986 (for which no documentation was located), 
1989, 1992, and 1993.114 The 1989 inspection report noted a 
number of violations of applicable regulations, including “no 
board-certified doctor on staff or contracted as a consultant; no 
nurses overseeing the recovery of patients; no transfer agreement 
with a hospital for emergency care; and no lab work recorded in 
several files.”115 When the clinic was next inspected in 1992, 
Gosnell still did not employ any nurses.116 Nevertheless, the 
inspectors reported “no deficiencies,” leaving blank the portions of 
the form dealing with anesthesia and postoperative care—where 
the inadequate staffing should have been noted.117 Gosnell still 
had not hired any nurses by the time of the 1993 inspection, and 
there were other deficiencies noted at that time, such as lab work 
missing from patient files.118 A few months later, however, a 
                                                                                                     
by various state departments and officials). 
 111. Id.  
 112. See id. at 137 (noting that the state Department of Health holds the 
responsibility of “writing and enforcing regulations to protect health and safety 
in abortion clinics”  and other health care facilities). 
 113. Id. at 138. 
 114. Id. at 138–43. Gosnell was initially a staff physician at the clinic, but by 
1989, he was the only doctor practicing there. Compare id. at 139 (“The [1979] 
DOH ‘site review’ at the time identified a certified obstetrician/gynecologist, 
Joni Magee, as the medical director, with Gosnell listed as a staff physician.”), 
with id. at 140 (“By 1989, Gosnell, who is not board-certified as either an 
obstetrician or a gynecologist, was the only doctor at the facility.”). 
 115. Id. at 140. 
 116. See id. (noting that the 1992 DOH inspection found that there were still 
no nurses employed by the clinic for the purpose of monitoring patient recovery). 
 117. See id. at 140–41 (describing a meeting in 1999 at which high-level 
government officials rejected the recommendation to reinstitute regular 
inspections of abortion clinics).   
 118. See id. at 141–42 (describing the 1992 Department of Health inspection 
of Dr. Gosnell’s clinic). 
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Department of Health employee, without a follow up inspection, 
recorded that the deficiencies had been corrected.119 
Even these half-hearted and ineffective inspections came to a 
halt after 1993, as reported by the grand jury: 
[T]he Pennsylvania Department of Health abruptly decided, 
for political reasons, to stop inspecting abortion clinics at all. 
The politics in question were not anti-abortion, but pro. With 
the change of administration from Governor Casey to 
Governor Ridge, officials concluded that inspections would be 
“putting a barrier up to women” seeking abortions.120 
There was a discussion of reinstituting inspections in 1999, 
but the decision was made not to do so.121 According to an 
attorney who participated in that meeting: 
[T]here was a concern that if they did routine inspections, that 
they may find a lot of these facilities didn’t meet [the 
standards for getting patients out by stretcher or wheelchair 
in an emergency], and then there would be less abortion 
facilities, less access to women to have an abortion.122 
After 1993, the Department of Health’s official policy was 
that abortion clinics would only be inspected in response to 
complaints.123 Over the years, the Department received multiple 
complaints about Gosnell’s clinic: 
                                                                                                     
 119. See id. at 142 (noting that it was reported that the deficiencies found in 
the 1993 inspection had been corrected without follow-up and Dr. Gosnell was 
sent another Certificate of Approval from the Department of Health). 
 120. Id. at 9. But see id. at 147 (noting that regular inspection of abortion 
clinics was reinstated in February of 2010, “finding authority in the same 
statute they used earlier to justify not inspecting”). 
 121. See id. (describing a meeting at which high-level government officials 
rejected the option of reinstituting regular inspections of abortion clinics).   
 122. Id. at 147. Sadly, Gosnell’s failure to comply with the requirements 
concerning emergency evacuation of patients contributed to the death of patient 
Karnamaya Mongar. See id. at 77  
Another violation of Pennsylvania law proved significant the night 
Karnamaya Mongar died: Clinics must have doors, elevators, and 
other passages adequate to allow stretcher-borne patients to be 
carried to a street-level exit. Gosnell’s clinic, with its narrow, twisted 
passageways, could not accommodate a stretcher at all. And his 
emergency street-level access was bolted with no accessible key. Any 
chance Mongar had of being revived was hampered by the time 
wasted looking for keys to the door. 
 123. See id. at 143 (noting that after 1993 the Department of Health’s policy 
was to inspect abortion clinics only if a complaint were filed, yet the department 
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• In 1996, an attorney informed the Department of Health 
that his client had suffered a perforated uterus, requiring 
a hysterectomy, as a result of Gosnell’s negligence.124 
• In 1996 or 1997, a pediatrician hand-delivered a complaint 
to the Department of Health after multiple teenage 
patients referred to Gosnell for abortions were “infected 
with trichomoniasis, a sexually transmitted parasite.”125 
The doctor sent a social worker to visit Gosnell’s clinic and 
then stopped referring patients there. The Department of 
Health did not keep a record of the complaint.126 
• In January 2002, an attorney contacted the Department of 
Health on behalf of the family of a twenty-two-year-old 
woman who died following an abortion by Gosnell. The 
department informed the attorney that no site inspections 
had been performed at Gosnell’s clinic because no 
complaints had been received (information that was 
inaccurate).127 
• In February 2002, a paralegal for another attorney 
representing an abortion patient contacted the 
Department of Health asking for information about the 
clinic.128 
• In 2007, an investigator for the medical examiner of 
Delaware County spoke with several employees of the 
Department of Health after an autopsy of a stillborn 
                                                                                                     
failed to respond to numerous complaints). 
 124. See id. at 143–44 (noting that one Department of Health employee 
reported that no complaints had been filed from 1993–2002, yet that employee 
had access to a 1996 complaint regarding a patient who suffered a perforated 
uterus). 
 125. See id. at 144 (detailing a complaint originally filed by a pediatrician 
who began noticing that patients returning from Gosnell’s clinic were infected 
with a sexually transmitted parasite that they did not have before their 
abortions). 
 126. See id. (noting that the pediatrician never heard back from the 
Department of Health regarding his complaint, nor was it included in response 
to the Grand Jury’s subpoena requesting all such complaints relating to 
Gosnell’s clinic). 
 127. See id. (explaining that, though the department told the attorney that 
there were no inspections of the clinic because there had been no complaints, 
complaints against the clinic had been filed between 1993 and 2002).   
 128. See id. at 145 (mentioning two other complaints received by the 
department). 
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infant showed that Gosnell had induced delivery in 
preparation for aborting a thirty-week-old fetus, in 
violation of the twenty-four-week limit under 
Pennsylvania law.129 Department of Health officials 
recommended that the investigator report the matter to a 
district attorney.130 
• In November 2009, Gosnell notified the Department of 
Health that another patient, Karnamaya Mongar, had 
died following an abortion at his clinic.131 
None of these inquiries, reports, and complaints prompted 
the Department of Health to visit Gosnell’s clinic.132 The clinic 
was not inspected for compliance with Pennsylvania laws and 
regulations for a period of over sixteen years, from 1993 to 
2010.133 Following the 1993 change in policy, the Department of 
Health did not visit Gosnell’s clinic again until they were asked to 
join law enforcement personnel investigating allegations that 
Gosnell wrote illegal prescriptions for controlled substances.134 
The grand jury concluded that the Department of Health’s failure 
to enforce Pennsylvania’s abortion laws and regulations went 
beyond bad management and appeared to amount to “purposeful 
neglect.”135 
                                                                                                     
 129. See id. at 146 (noting the Department of Health’s failure to investigate 
or file a complaint when a medical examiner reported a thirty week abortion 
performed by Gosnell). 
 130. See id. (explaining that the department referred the medical examiner 
to the District Attorney’s office because neither the Department of Health nor 
the state medical board had authority over the issue); id. at 84–86 (noting that a 
medical examiner reported Gosnell’s abortion of a thirty week fetus to the 
Department of Health, but the department “took no action”).   
 131. See id. at 149 (noting that on November 24, 2009, Gosnell faxed the 
Department of Health a letter notifying it that Mongar died following an 
abortion, though he incorrectly stated the date of her procedure). 
 132. See id. at 143 (“The state Department of Health failed to investigate 
Gosnell’s clinic even in response to complaints.”). 
 133. See id. at 142–43 (noting that after the 1993 inspection, sixteen years 
passed without further on-site inspection). 
 134. See id. at 152 (“It was not until February 18, 2010, when DOH 
representatives were escorted in by law enforcement agents, that they finally 
inspected the clinic that they had not bothered to visit in 13 years.”). 
 135. See id. at 170 (noting that the Department of Health’s policy of 
inspecting abortion clinics only in response to complaints and its failure to 
respond to complaints “reflect[s] purposeful neglect” and raises the question 
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The Pennsylvania Department of State, which oversees 
medical licensing through its Board of Medicine, was another 
agency that could have exercised regulatory authority with 
respect to Gosnell’s practice.136 Like the Department of Health, 
the Board of Medicine received a number of complaints about 
Gosnell over the years: 
• In December 2001, a former employee of Gosnell’s, 
Marcella Stanley Choung, filed a complaint about the 
clinic.137 According to the grand jury, she reported that 
Gosnell was using unlicensed workers 
(including herself) to give IV anesthesia to 
patients when he was not at the clinic; that his 
facility was filthy; that two sick, flea-infested 
cats roamed freely in the procedure rooms, 
vomiting throughout; that Gosnell ate in the 
procedure rooms; that the autoclave used to 
sterilize instruments was broken; that he 
reused single-use curettes; that there were no 
licensed nurses at the facility when IV 
anesthesia was administered; that Gosnell 
allowed one patient to use her cousin’s 
insurance card to pay for an abortion; that 
Gosnell performed abortions on ‘underage 
children’ against their will if their mothers 
asked him to; and that he performed other 
abortions without consent forms.138 
A cursory investigation was done of some of Choung’s claims, 
though simple steps were not taken, such as visiting the clinic 
or interviewing other unlicensed employees, which could have 
verified her allegations.139  
                                                                                                     
whether it actually intended to protect the health and safety of women seeking 
abortions). 
 136. See id. at 173 (explaining that the Department of State’s Bureau of 
Professional and Occupational Affairs oversees twenty-nine boards, including 
the Board of Medicine, which was aware of Gosnell’s illegal practices). 
 137. See id. at 176–80 (detailing Choung’s complaint and noting the 
Department of States’s failure to adequately investigate). 
 138. Id. at 177. 
 139. Id. at 177–79. 
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• In 2002, an insurance company reported that it had paid 
$400,000 to settle a claim by the family of Semika Shaw, a 
twenty-two-year-old who died following an abortion by 
Gosnell.140 
• In 2005, an attorney sent the Board of Medicine a 
malpractice complaint alleging that Gosnell had 
administered an anesthetic that should not be given to a 
methadone patient like the plaintiff, resulting in a 
seizure.141 The Board of Medicine took no action, even 
though the attorney pointed out that Gosnell was 
uninsured at the time of the incident.142 
• A different official at the Board of Medicine was handling 
a report that Gosnell did not have insurance as required 
by law, a violation that could have been verified through 
investigation.143 Gosnell in fact performed abortions in 
Pennsylvania for ten months without insurance, telling 
his insurer that he was only practicing in Delaware at the 
time.144 
• In 2008, the Board of Medicine received a copy of a 
malpractice complaint against Gosnell for tearing a 
patient’s cervix, uterus, and bowel during an incomplete 
abortion that left fetal parts in the patient’s body.145 
Gosnell allegedly delayed sending the patient to the 
hospital, where she required extensive surgery.146 A 
                                                                                                     
 140. See id. at 174 (noting that the Department of State took no action 
though it received notification of a $400,000 settlement to the family of Semika 
Shaw). 
 141. See id. at 181–82 (detailing the complaint).   
 142. See id. at 182–83 (noting that the Department of State closed the case 
even though Gosnell failed to satisfy insurance coverage requirements). 
 143. See id. at 183 (noting that an attorney for the Bureau of Professional 
and Occupational Affairs continuously checked with compliance officers to 
ascertain whether or not Gosnell was insured, but ultimately closed the file in 
2008 without further investigation); id. at 183–84 (explaining that by 
conducting a real investigation or subpoenaing documents, attorneys could have 
discovered Gosnell’s lack of insurance).  
 144. See id. at 183–84 (noting that Gosnell did not have insurance between 
July 15, 2004, and April 18, 2005, and that during this time he told his 
insurance agent that he was only practicing in Delaware). 
 145. See id. at 184–85 (reciting facts of the complaint). 
 146. See id. at 184 (noting that Gosnell refused to call an ambulance, forcing 
the patient to wait for several hours before she was finally taken to a hospital, 
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simple search of a database maintained by the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services could have 
disclosed that at least five other women had previously 
successfully sued Gosnell for perforating their uteruses, 
but the Board’s investigator allegedly did not have access 
to the database.147 
The grand jury was particularly surprised that Department of 
State officials closed the files on both the allegations by former 
employee Marcella Choung and the reported death of patient 
Semika Shaw on the same day without further action.148 
A third agency that failed to take action despite reports of 
major problems at Gosnell’s clinic was the Philadelphia 
Department of Public Health.149 A city employee visited Gosnell’s 
clinic in July 2008 in connection with a vaccine program.150 She 
found the clinic being run by “clueless” employees151 and noted 
pervasive unsanitary conditions: “[T]he office was not clean at all, 
and many areas of the clinic smell like urine.”152 Expired vaccines 
were kept in a refrigerator with incomplete temperature logs.153 
Chicken pox vaccines were stored in a freezer along with the 
                                                                                                     
where she required surgery). 
 147. See id. at 185–86 (explaining that the National Practitioner Data Bank 
(NPDB) allows state boards of medicine to identify and discipline medical 
practitioners engaging in unprofessional behavior and that the NPDB or 
Department of State records should have easily revealed Gosnell’s history of 
perforating uteruses). See id. at 11 for information on a successful civil suit filed 
against Gosnell after a twenty-two-year-old woman died from sepsis when 
Gosnell perforated her uterus during an abortion. 
 148. See id. at 181 (finding it “incomprehensible” that a single Board of 
Medicine prosecutor and his supervisor could dispose of the Choung and Shaw 
allegations at the same time). 
 149. See id. at 199–212 (detailing the Philadelphia Department of Public 
Health’s failure to respond to various complaints).   
 150. See id. at 200–01 (detailing the July 2008 vaccine inspection of 
Gosnell’s clinic).  
 151. See id. at 200 (noting that a Department of Public Health employee had 
trouble scheduling an appointment at Gosnell’s clinic and that two women 
whom she described as “clueless” were present the day of the appointment 
rather than Gosnell or the office manager). 
 152. Id. at 201. The employee noted layers of dust on the baseboards and 
murky water in the fish tanks. Id.   
 153. See id. (noting that expired vaccines were found in the refrigerator with 
March 2006 and 2005 expiration dates and the temperature log had not been 
completed for nearly one and a half months). 
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bloody remains of aborted fetuses.154 The employee returned in 
October 2009 and again wrote a report detailing problems at the 
clinic, raising the question of why she saw patients in the 
procedure area at a time when Gosnell was absent and the only 
“doctor” at the clinic did not have a Pennsylvania medical 
license.155 Based on the employee’s reports, Gosnell’s clinic was 
suspended from the vaccine program, but no further action was 
taken.156 City health officials never followed through on plans to 
report Gosnell to state licensing authorities.157 The grand jury 
also found that at least five of Gosnell’s patients received 
emergency room care at nearby hospitals following abortions, but 
apparently in only one instance did the hospital satisfy its state 
law duty to report complications from abortions.158 
                                                                                                     
 154. Id. at 201. Gosnell had previously been reported to the city health 
department for problems related to the storage and disposal of fetal remains. 
See id. at 204–07 (detailing the city health department’s inspections of Gosnell’s 
infectious waste disposal procedures and its failure to enforce the applicable 
regulations). 
 155. See id. at 202 (reporting that a doctor working at Gosnell’s clinic was 
not actually licensed in the state of Pennsylvania and falsely claimed to have a 
Delaware license); id. at 203 (“Matijkiw concluded her report to her boss: ‘If Dr. 
Gosnell was out of the office and [the unlicensed physician] had to call the other 
physician’s assistant on his cell phone and leave a message for his MA#, why 
were patients in the procedure area?’”). 
 156. Id. at 201. 
 157. See id. at 200–03 (noting that after the 2007 and 2009 visits, immediate 
action should have been taken by the city health department or the information 
should have been passed to other state departments, “yet the city health 
department did nothing”). 
 158. See id. at 213–14 (noting that of the five women who received 
emergency medical services at two nearby emergency rooms, the only report 
involved a woman who died at the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania). 
Until recently, Maryland was another state that did not inspect abortion clinics. 
The state is in the process of implementing inspection procedures. Cf. Erik 
Eckholm, Maryland’s Path to an Accord in Abortion Fight, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/us/marylands-path-to-an-accord-in-
abortion-fight.html?_r=0 (last visited Jan. 11, 2014) (noting that only recently 
did Maryland begin the process of implementing inspection procedures) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Andrea K. Walker, Maryland 
Suspends Licenses of 3 Abortion Clinics, BALTIMORE SUN (Mar. 12, 2013), 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-03-12/health/bs-hs-abortion-clinic-suspen 
sion-20130308_1_abortion-clinics-clinics-face-surgical-abortion-procedures (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2014) (reporting the suspension of three Maryland abortion 
clinics nearly eight months after the state began regulating abortion facilities) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Other states have inspected 
abortion providers since well before the Gosnell case came to light. See, e.g., 
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V. Measures That Could Help States Protect Viable Fetuses 
We have to this point examined three different barriers that, 
individually and together, make it difficult for states to protect 
the lives of viable fetuses that could survive outside the womb. 
First, the Supreme Court’s case law seems to call for some level of 
deference to a determination of nonviability by a doctor who 
wants to perform an abortion,159 even though that determination 
may be erroneous and inconsistent with the conclusions that 
would be reached by other physicians.160 Second, abortions near 
the viability threshold or beyond typically take place in private 
facilities operated by abortion providers, making it difficult to 
monitor compliance with a legal prohibition on postviability 
abortions.161 Third, in some jurisdictions, public officials may be 
unwilling to provide close oversight of abortion clinics.162 Now we 
will consider measures that, if permitted by the courts, might 
assist a state in vindicating its compelling interest in protecting 
the lives of viable fetuses. 
The first difficulty arises from using a relatively uncertain 
medical determination, like the fact of fetal viability, as a 
regulatory line to be enforced by public authorities.163 Bright lines 
make law enforcement easier.164 Conversely, law enforcement 
                                                                                                     
Amended Order, Virginia Board of Medicine (May 23, 2006), 
http://www.dhp.virginia.gov/Notices/Medicine/0101043653/0101043653Order110
62006.pdf (reporting the results of an unannounced inspection due to in-office 
use of anesthesia).   
 159. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (explaining relevant case law 
regarding the Court’s deference to the physician’s determination of viability). 
 160. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 396 (1979) (noting that 
physicians may disagree about whether second trimester fetuses are viable). 
 161. See supra Part III (providing details on Gosnell’s clinic, a private 
abortion facility that performed late term abortions and avoided regulation for 
several years). 
 162. See supra Part IV (discussing lack of investigation by state and local 
authorities in the Gosnell case). 
 163. See Colautti, 439 U.S. at 395–96 (describing factors which contribute to 
the uncertainty of determining fetal viability). 
 164. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 397 
(6th Cir. 2004) (“The music industry, as well as the courts, are best served if 
something approximating a bright-line test can be established.”); New York v. 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1981) (“When a person cannot know how a court 
will apply a settled principle to a recurring factual situation, that person cannot 
know the scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the 
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efforts are hindered to the extent that the line between legal and 
illegal conduct is difficult to discern. A rule that doctors may 
perform an abortion on any nonviable fetus, combined with a 
requirement of deference to the doctor’s conclusion, will make it 
hard to pursue cases near the margin of viability. The problem 
may be exacerbated by the due process requirement that guilt in 
criminal cases be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.165 The 
Supreme Court’s case law virtually guarantees that doctors will 
be able to perform abortions on some viable fetuses, even 
knowingly, and still avoid successful law enforcement efforts. 
Various jurisdictions in recent years have enacted laws 
forbidding abortion after twenty weeks.166 Such laws often 
measure the twenty week period from fertilization; as a 
consequence, they really apply twenty-two weeks after a woman’s 
last menstrual period (LMP), a standard way of measuring 
gestation.167 Many doctors believe that viability occurs in typical 
pregnancies around twenty-four weeks LMP.168 As a consequence, 
such laws seek to restrict elective abortions a couple of weeks 
before viability might occur in a typical pregnancy.169 
The twenty week abortion laws have often been defended 
based on contested evidence that the fetus might be capable of 
                                                                                                     
scope of his authority.”).  
 165. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970) (stating that guilt in a 
criminal case must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt (citing Brinegar v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949))). 
 166. See Erik Eckholm, Theory on Pain Is Driving Rules for Abortion, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/02/us/theory-on-pain-is-
driving-rules-for-abortions.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (last visited Jan. 11, 
2014) [hereinafter Eckholm, Theory on Pain Is Driving Rules for Abortion] 
(reporting various proposed bans on abortions at twenty weeks on the theory 
that fetuses can feel pain at that gestational age) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 167. See Julie Rovner, State Laws Limiting Abortion May Face Challenges 
on 20-Week Limit, NPR (July 22, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2013/ 
07/19/203729609/state-laws-limiting-abortion-may-face-challenges-on-20-week-
limit (last visited Jan. 11, 2014) (explaining that fertilization usually occurs 
about two weeks after the woman’s last menstrual period) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 168. See id. (noting that there is a “consensus that viability doesn’t happen 
before 24 weeks”). 
 169. See generally id. (explaining that “when we’re talking about banning 
abortion at 20 or 22 weeks even, that’s clearly at least two weeks before the 
earliest point in pregnancy where viability would be a concern”). 
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feeling pain at that stage of pregnancy.170 However, an 
alternative ground for sustaining such laws would be the 
compelling state interest in protecting viable fetuses. The twenty-
week line (or twenty-two weeks LMP) would be easier to 
ascertain and subject to fewer disagreements among medical 
professionals than a regulatory line based on fetal viability.171 As 
a consequence, it would be an easier line for the state to enforce. 
Such a twenty-week limit on elective abortions would give the 
state a modest margin of error and help guard against the risk 
that viable fetuses will be aborted based on erroneous (or 
fraudulent) determinations that they are not viable. 
States are also hindered in protecting viable fetuses because 
abortions are typically performed in private abortion facilities, 
making it possible for doctors who perform postviability abortions 
to conceal their conduct.172 Though the problem might be 
addressed through close oversight of abortion clinics, public 
officials in some states have proved unwilling to monitor clinics to 
ensure compliance with the law.173 These problems could be 
partially addressed through adoption of hospitalization 
requirements. 
While the Supreme Court has declined to permit a 
hospitalization requirement for all second-trimester abortions,174 
there is strong evidence that risks from second-trimester 
abortions increase significantly with each additional week of 
                                                                                                     
 170. See Eckholm, Theory on Pain Is Driving Rules for Abortion, supra note 
166 (reporting proposed bans on abortions at twenty weeks, many of which are 
based on the theory that a fetus can feel pain at that stage in development). 
 171. The Colautti Court noted that gestational age is one of several 
uncertain factors that play into medical decisions about fetal viability. Colautti 
v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395–96 (1979). It is virtually axiomatic that there will 
be more grounds for disagreement over application of a multi-factor analysis 
than there will be over one of the factors considered in isolation. 
 172. See, e.g., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 67, at 247 (noting a lack of 
sufficient evidence because many of Gosnell’s illicit activities were performed 
inside his private clinic). 
 173. See, e.g., id. at 137–215 (describing the lack of state and local 
supervision of Gosnell’s private abortion clinic in Pennsylvania). 
 174. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 
416, 452 (1983) (invalidating city ordinance requiring physicians to perform all 
second trimester abortions at accredited hospitals); Planned Parenthood Ass’n of 
Kan. City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 481–82 (1983) (striking a requirement that 
second semester abortions be performed in hospitals). 
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pregnancy.175 Even Planned Parenthood is willing to acknowledge 
that “[a]fter 20 weeks, the risk of death from childbirth and 
abortion are about the same,”176 but there is good reason to 
believe that carrying a pregnancy to term is in fact safer than 
abortion at advanced stages of pregnancy. The Guttmacher 
Institute acknowledges that abortion risks increase the later in 
pregnancy the abortion is performed.177 The study cited by the 
Guttmacher Institute found that risks from abortion increase 
exponentially as pregnancy progresses: 
Compared with women whose abortions were performed at or 
before 8 weeks of gestation, women whose abortions were 
performed in the second trimester were significantly more 
likely to die of abortion-related causes. The relative risk 
(unadjusted) of abortion-related mortality was 14.7 at 13–15 
                                                                                                     
 175. See ABORTION AFTER THE FIRST TRIMESTER, supra note 66, at 3 (noting 
that the rate of complication increases for each week of gestation after eight 
weeks). 
 176. See In-Clinic Abortion Procedures, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, 
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/health-topics/abortion/in-clinic-abortion-pro 
cedures-4359.asp (last visited Aug. 10, 2013) (comparing the risk of abortion and 
childbirth) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). A consent form 
used at one clinic performing late term abortions informs patients that “[t]he 
risk of terminating a pregnancy gradually increases throughout the course of 
pregnancy. These comparative risks become approximately equal at 16–18 
weeks of pregnancy and increase so that pregnancy termination at 18 weeks and 
above involves a greater risk than carrying the pregnancy to term.” Informed 
Consent for Pregnancy Termination Treatment, Anesthetic, and Other Medical 
Services, Southwestern Women’s Options, PROTECT ABQ WOMEN & CHILDREN, 
http://www.protectabqwomenandchildren.com/southwestern-womens-options-
consent-form.html (last visited November 23, 2013) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Betsy Woodruff, Albuquerque Votes on Late-Term 
Abortion Ban, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.national 
review.com/article/364170/albuquerque-votes-late-term-abortion-ban-betsy-wood 
ruff (last visited Jan. 11, 2014) (“[T]he form clearly states that having an 
abortion after 18 weeks is more dangerous than carrying the pregnancy to 
term.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 177. See Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. 
(Feb. 2014), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.html (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2014) (“The risk of death associated with abortion increases with 
the length of pregnancy, from one death for every one million abortions at or 
before eight weeks to one per 29,000 at 16–20 weeks—and one per 11,000 at 21 
weeks or later.” (citation omitted)) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
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weeks of gestation, 29.5 at 16–20 weeks, and 76.6 at or after 
21 weeks.178 
The researchers found a mortality rate of 8.9 deaths per 100,000 
abortions at 21 weeks and above.179 By way of comparison, the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reports that, as of 
1997, overall maternal mortality from carrying a pregnancy to 
term was 7.7 deaths per 100,000 live births.180 The researchers 
cited by the Guttmacher Institute developed a model from their 
data showing “a 38% increase in risk of death for each additional 
week of gestation.”181 
In addition to the safety advantages of a hospitalization 
requirement partway through the second trimester, performance 
of late-term abortions in a hospital would make it more difficult 
to violate a law restricting elective, postviability abortions. With 
such a hospitalization requirement in place, abortions near the 
viability threshold would be performed in a mainstream medical 
facility, rather than a facility dedicated to performance of 
abortions. This would help promote the accuracy and availability 
of medical records relevant to issues of compliance with state 
law.182 It would also ensure the presence of medical personnel 
with fewer incentives to violate the law or cover up violations by 
others. 
VI. Conclusion 
When it comes to abortion, there are many points on which 
Americans disagree. One point of widespread agreement, 
however, is that states should be able to restrict access to 
abortion of viable fetuses capable of living independent of the 
                                                                                                     
 178. Bartlett et al., supra note 67, at 729. The author has omitted certain 
95% confidence interval data from this source to enhance readability. 
 179. Id. at 733. 
 180. Achievements in Public Health, 1900–1999: Healthier Mothers and 
Babies, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Oct. 1, 1999), 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm 4838a2.htm (last visited Jan. 
11, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 181. Bartlett et al., supra note 67, at 731. 
 182. See GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 68, at 247 (believing that Gosnell 
avoided many criminal charges because the illicit activities were isolated within 
his clinic and therefore it became difficult to secure ample evidence). 
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mother.183 An examination of Supreme Court case law184 and 
review of the Gosnell case show that even this relatively modest 
goal can be quite difficult for a state to attain.185 It would be 
appropriate for the Supreme Court to help states vindicate their 
compelling interest in protecting viable fetuses by permitting a 
reasonable margin for enforcement prior to the uncertain 
viability threshold and by allowing a requirement of 
hospitalization as that threshold approaches. 
                                                                                                     
 183. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
(reaffirming Roe’s holding that states may regulate abortions of viable fetuses); 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1973) (concluding that the state’s interest in 
protecting potential life becomes compelling at viability). 
 184. See supra Part II for more discussion of relevant case law. 
 185. See supra Part III for more on the Gosnell case. 
